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HOSPITAL FINANCIAL PRESSURES 
AND THE HEALTH OF THE UNINSURED. 








The United States relies on charitable medical care to serve the uninsured, most of which is 
offered by hospitals that act as providers of last resort and that constitute the “safety net”. This 
paper analyzes the effect that hospital financial stress has on the health of the uninsured. In 
particular we look at managed care. Managed care penetration has often been blamed for 
increasing financial pressures on hospitals, and previous work has shown that safety net hospitals 
have been affected more severely by it. Our findings are threefold: first, we find that managed 
care financial pressures encourage charity care patients to concentrate in public hospitals. 
Second, we find that these hospitals, in turn, see a decrease in their quality of care in areas where 
managed care penetration is stronger. Finally we also find that managed care diffusion has a 
negative effect on the quality of care received by the uninsured – as measured by the probability 
of dying after a heart attack – and of those that go to government hospitals. 
 
 
Keywords: uninsured, hospitals, financial care, quality. 
 
1 Professor of Economics, IESE 
 
 
NOTE: I thank David M. Cutler; Bruno Cassiman, and the many participants in the Harvard public finance research 
seminar and workshop and in the ASHE meetings for comments on a previous draft. Financial support from 
Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia SEJ2006-11833. 
  
 





HOSPITAL FINANCIAL PRESSURES 
AND THE HEALTH OF THE UNINSURED. 
WHO GETS HURT? THE CASE OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
I. Introduction  
In 2007, there were nearly 46 million uninsured individuals in the United States – that is about 
18% of the population under 65.
1 Traditionally, the United States has relied on an institutional 
“safety net” – comprised largely of government, teaching hospitals and hospitals located in 
poor areas – to provide at least the basic health care needs to this distressed population. For 
many years, hospitals were able to finance the provision of charity care through a complex 
system of cross-subsidies where privately insured patients were charged higher prices that 
helped cover indigent care costs
2 (Aaron, 1991; Cutler, 1995). Hence, hospital financial health 
plays a crucial role in its ability to provide charity care. 
The goal of this paper is to shed some light on the effect that hospital financial stress might 
have on the quality of care received by the uninsured. 
For this, we will focus on the financial pressures imposed by managed care. Duke (1996) 
already identified managed care as a “primary force” affecting hospital revenues. By imposing 
strict cost-control mechanisms to doctors and hospitals, managed care has threatened the 
delicate net of cross-subsidies to finance charity care, challenging the future financial viability 
and survival of historical providers of health care to the uninsured. 
We look at the case of managed care because managed care penetration has been one of the 
most important changes in the United States health care market in the last decades and 
has played a crucial role in shaping today’s healthcare marketplace. It has changed all 
the physician’s practice patterns (Baker and Shankarkumar, 1997) and the competition in the 
health care market. For instance, by initially paying prices about 30% below those paid 
by traditional insurers (Cutler and Barro, 1997), managed care organizations contributed to 
restricting doctors’ wages, not only within the managed care network but also in the whole 
health care market, and raising competition amongst providers. Understanding the effect of 
                                              
1 DeNavas-Walt, C.B. Proctor, and J. Smith, “Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 
2007”, United States Census Bureau; August 2008. 
2 A study of the American Hospital Association calculates that the average paying hospital patient subsidizes charity 
care by paying a “hidden tax” of 10.6%.  
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managed care on the health of the uninsured is a first step in helping us comprehend the role 
that current financial pressures could have on the health of this distressed population. 
Some previous work has already related the financial pressures imposed by managed care on 
the provision of charity care by hospitals. For instance, authors such Thorpe and Phelps (1988) 
or Frank et al. (1990) have shown that an increase in competition reduces the provision of 
charity care. Currie and Fahr (2004) demonstrate that higher managed care penetration rates 
lead to an increase in the share of uninsured patients treated by public hospitals at the expense 
of losing the more profitable Medicaid patients to private ones. Richardson (2000) finds a 
negative impact of managed care on access to care for the poor. Mas (2009) showed that 
managed care disproportionately encouraged the closure of safety net hospitals as well as those 
hospital services most commonly used by the uninsured, such as emergency rooms, obstetrics 
and alcohol and drug treatments, having an important negative effect on their access to care. 
However, very little is known about the effect that hospital financial incentives have on the 
quality of care received by the uninsured. The goal of this paper is to go one step further and 
analyze whether managed care, by imposing financial pressures on hospitals, has had a 
negative effect on the health of the uninsured in the United States. For this analysis, we use 
data on all hospital discharges in California for 1985 and 1995. We chose this period because it 
encompasses the most relevant years for the introduction of managed care in California.
3 
One of the major obstacles when looking at quality of care involves its measurement. Here, we 
focus on the proportion of patients with acute myocardial infarction (AMI) who die in the 
hospital. We use this measure for several reasons. First, because death is a generally accepted 
quality measure and it is a relatively common outcome for heart attacks. Second, AMI cases are 
not immediately fatal if the patient is rapidly admitted to a hospital and, hence, the hospital 
intervention is crucial. Finally, this measure of hospital quality has already been used in the 
literature (McClellan and Staiger, 2000). 
Our results are twofold: first, at the hospital level, we find that managed care contributes to a 
shift of charity care patients toward government hospitals, confirming the findings of Currie 
and Fahr (2004) regarding charity care. Moreover, the results also seem to point toward the 
possibility of a trade-off between the number of charity care patients and the quality of care 
provided. Government hospitals, now receiving a higher proportion of non-paying patients 
while keeping their budget almost constant, experience a decline in the quality of care they 
provide.  
Second, at the patient level, our results show that managed care penetration has a negative 
impact on the healthcare outcomes (measured as the probability of dying after an AMI) of 
uninsured patients and of those that attend government hospitals. 
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 presents the conceptual framework and 
the hypothesis. The data used is described in section 3. Section 4 includes the methodology and 
the results and, finally, section 5 concludes.  
 
                                              
3 This is the period most commonly looked at in the managed care literature (see, for instance, Mas and Seinfeld 
(2008); Currie and Fahr (2004), Baker and Shankarkumar (1997), etc.). Moreover, since then the managed care 
penetration has stabilized and the health care market place has been affected by its changes.   
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II. Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
a) Managed care 
One of the most important changes in hospital payment incentives in the United States has 
been the shift from traditional insurance to managed care. The growth of managed care 
insurance has been dramatic, with the percentage of privately insured Americans with a 
managed care contract rising from 27% in 1988 to 93% in 2001.
4 Between 1986 and 1995 the 
proportion of privately insured who were enrolled in a Health Maintenance Organization 
(henceforth, HMO) contract went from 15 to 43%. 
Managed care imposed a strong emphasis on cost containment and it gave rise to competitive 
pressures among providers to reduce costs (Baker, 1999; Baker and Shankarkumar, 1997). 
There are two main differences between traditional insurance plans and managed care. First, 
traditional insurers barely monitored utilization as they allowed providers to decide the 
treatment and paid them on a fee-for-service basis. Managed care plans generally establish a 
capped payment or a fixed salary for physicians and use contractual means to enforce price 
discipline and utilization control on hospitals and specialists. This arrangement changes 
providers’ incentives as they no longer make money on the volume of patients treated and 
services provided, but by decreasing the use and costs of their services. For instance, managed 
care organizations paid prices about 30% below those paid by traditional insurers (Cutler and 
Barro, 1997). There are several methods used to control utilization: managed care plans use 
primary care physicians as “gatekeepers”, requiring their previous referral before the enrollees 
can consult a specialist. Many plans also limit the number of hospital days and require 
physicians to follow some established guidelines to treat a certain diagnosis. 
Second, traditional insurance plans allowed patients unlimited access to the providers of their 
choice. Managed care removes equal choice of doctors and hospitals by establishing a network 
of approved providers. This restriction may be direct – covering its members only when they 
see the selected providers – or indirect – using a co-payment system to encourage the insured 
to use the services provided by their own network. As the number of managed care enrollees 
goes up, so does the importance of access to the network, since the hospitals that do not belong 
to it will not get managed care patients. In turn, the importance of the network increases the 
bargaining power of managed care organizations. 
Current plans include several types of organizations. In the HMOs, patients are only allowed to 
visit those providers that belong to the network in exchange for a prepaid premium and, 
generally, with very low or no copayments. Here providers are usually paid on a capped basis. 
Preferred Providers Organizations (PPOs) correspond to another type of managed care 
organization where patients are allowed to use a limited number of providers with no 
copayment but, if they want to use a physician outside the network, the insurance company 
will pay a limited amount to that provider. Physicians are reimbursed on a discounted fee-for-
service basis. The Independent Practice Association (IPA) arrangement contracts with physicians 
on a non-exclusive basis, so that they are allowed to cover patients who also have other types 
of insurance contracts. Finally, the Point-of-service (POS) corresponds to an arrangement where 
                                              
4 Trends & Indicators in the Changing Health Care Marketplace, 2002 – Chartbook. 
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the patient can choose providers but she would pay a higher copayment if the chosen provider 
does not belong to the network. 
b) The Uninsured and the Safety Net 
The number of uninsured in the United States has been rising since 1987. In 1987 there were 
31.8 million uninsured. In 1998, 44 million Americans lacked any regular health insurance 
coverage and in 2007 this number rose up to almost 46 million (18% of the non-elderly).
5 The 
proportion of uninsured varies greatly with income. In 2007, about two-thirds of the uninsured 
were poor or near poor (Kaiser, 2008). In 1998, 34.7% of the population below 200% of the 
poverty line were uninsured, while only 4.6% of those with income above 400% of the poverty 
line lacked health insurance (Current Population Survey). 
The uninsured are less likely to have a regular source of care, are more likely to report that they 
have not received the needed care and wait until they are seriously ill to seek medical care 
(American College of Physicians-American Society of Internal Medicine, 2000). In 2000, 20% of 
the United States uninsured reported not getting medical care for serious conditions.
6 
Because the United States lacks universal health coverage, it relies on charitable medical care to 
serve the uninsured. Most of this charity care is provided by hospitals that serve as providers of 
last resort. These providers that organize and deliver a significant level of care to the uninsured 
and Medicaid patients constitute the safety net. For many of the uninsured, access to care is 
possible thanks to the safety net, constituted mostly by public hospitals, teaching hospitals and 
those located in poor areas (Mas, 2009). 
c) The Impact of Managed Care on the Health of the Uninsured 
Managed care has affected the environment in which safety net providers operate. By imposing 
strict cost-control mechanisms, it has reduced hospital revenues (Duke, 1996) and it has 
threatened their ability to keep cross-subsidizing charity care through private insured patients. 
The reduction of the price paid by the privately insured makes it more difficult for the safety 
net hospitals to keep serving charity care patients. 
Managed care may affect the health care received by the uninsured through several channels: 
First, by encouraging the closure of safety net hospitals and of those services most commonly 
used by the uninsured, managed care can negatively affect access to care for charity care 
patients. Mas (2009) already found that managed care had a positive effect on the closure of 
safety net hospitals, both in the United States and in California. She also found that, for those 
hospitals that remained open, managed care had a positive effect on the closure of those 
services most commonly used by the uninsured (emergency rooms, obstetrics and alcohol and 
drug treatment centers). Interestingly, Mas also found that if a public hospital was the only 
public hospital in the metropolitan area (henceforth, “MSA”) it was more likely to keep 
operating. 
A reduction on the number of safety net hospitals and their higher termination of these services 
traditionally used by the uninsured implies that the average patient in the area has to travel 
                                              
5 United States Census Bureau. 
6 Trends and Indicators in the Changing Healthcare Marketplace; Kaiser family foundation.  
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greater distances in order to obtain medical care. Currie and Reagan (1998) found that distance to 
hospital has significant effects on the utilization of preventive care among central-city black 
children, for which an additional mile to the hospital was associated with a 3% decline in their 
probability of having a checkup. Goodman et al. (1997) found that medical hospitalizations for 
patients living more than 30 minutes away from the hospital was 0.85 times the hospitalization of 
those living in a zip code with a hospital. Following this literature, a reduction of the number 
of hospitals and services traditionally used by the uninsured – and the consequent increase in the 
distance that patients have to travel to get medical care – could translate to a worsening of their 
health status.  
Hence, the first mechanism through which managed care could affect the health of the 
uninsured is by worsening their access to health care. However, in order to determine the extent 
to which access to care has actually been affected, we need to check that uninsured patients do 
not shift to other hospitals to obtain charity care in those areas where managed care is stronger. 
For instance, they might shift to public hospitals, especially given the fact that they have been 
found to face important pressures to remain open if they are the only public hospital in the 
MSA. This corresponds to the first part of the empirical analysis. 
The second mechanism relates to the quality of care received. Even if the uninsured shift now 
to the hospitals that remain open, those hospitals are subject to a financial squeeze, since now 
they have to supply more charity care with the same amount of revenues than before (or even 
less, due to the financial pressures). This might lead to a potential trade-off between quality and 
quantity of care. This will be the second part of the empirical analysis. 
Finally, the ultimate goal of this paper is to analyze the effect that managed care has had on 
the health of the uninsured. Since managed care has been shown to affect different types of 
hospitals differently – mainly, safety net hospitals are affected more severely (Mas, 2009) – the 
important element here is to distinguish the effect of managed care on the health of those 
patients who lack health insurance (mainly through postponing their hospital visits due to 
managed care effect on the closure of safety net hospitals – the first mechanism) from the effect 
of managed care on the health of other patients who have insurance but just happen to go to a 
hospital that is now facing the trade-off mentioned in the second mechanism above. This is 
done in the third part of our analysis. 
III. Data 
To further examine these questions we will focus on California. The first reason to do so is that, 
to measure quality of care, we need to use hospital discharge data. California was the only state 
that had such information available for us to use during this time period. We will use the 
California Hospital Discharge Data from the Office of Statewide Healthcare Planning and 
Development (OSHPD). It contains information on every hospital discharge (approximately 
3.6 million per year), including the patient’s expected payer (self-pay, charity, Medicare, etc.), 
the patient’s diagnosis and whether the patient died in the hospital. The second reason is that 
California is a natural state to study because of its size and data availability and it also has a 
lot of variation regarding managed care penetration in its territory, which facilitates the 
identification of its effect. Moreover, Mas (2009) already found that, in California, the effect of 
managed care on hospital closures and the closure of those services most commonly used by 
the uninsured followed trends similar to the ones obtained using the whole United States data.  
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However, California differs from the rest of the United States in the fact that its managed care 
penetration has been stronger and is now a more mature phenomenon. 
Charity care: We use the information on the patient’s expected payer from the OSHPD. We 
include as uncompensated care those patients whose expected source of payment is one of the 
following: self-pay, no charge or medically indigent. Some people consider as charity care 
those who receive Medicaid (Medi-Cal, in California) as well. For robustness checks, we will 
also look at the separated from the uncompensated care ones and then we will consider them 
together as well. In 1985, California teaching hospitals provided 38% of the MSA total charity 
care and served 35% of the total MSA Medi-Cal patients. Government-non-teaching hospitals 
provided 46% of the MSA charity care and 40% of Medi-Cal care, and non-public hospitals 
located in poor areas provided 7% and 15% of the MSA charity care and Medi-Cal care, 
respectively. 
Managed care enrollment: To account for the effect of managed care on the quality of care for 
the uninsured, we use the share of the MSA population enrolled in HMOs, which has been the 
standard measure for managed care enrollment used in the literature – see, for instance Cutler 
and McClellan (1996); Baker (1997); Cutler and Sheiner (1998). We use data from the Baker 
estimates in managed care enrollment. Baker constructed estimates of county-level enrollment 
using data from the Group Health Association of America and he distributed HMO enrollment 
among the counties of its service area taking into account their population and the distance to 
the HMO headquarters. Moreover, in order to further lessen any potential problem, our analysis 
is done at the MSA level. 
There is the possibility that some unobserved variables affect both the health of the uninsured 
and managed care enrollment. For instance, managed care organizations might be less willing 
to operate in areas where the uninsured population goes to the hospital more frequently. To 
correct for these potential endogeneity problems, we will also present our results instrumenting 
managed care enrollment by average firm size in the MSA. This is the usual instrument used in 
the literature (Baker, 1997; Baker and Brown, 1999; Mas and Seinfeld, 2008). It reflects the fact 
that larger firms are more likely to contract with managed care organizations to offer health 
care benefits to their employees than the smaller ones. 
Quality of care: One of the major obstacles when looking at the quality of care involves its 
measurement. As a quality measure, we will use the proportion of patients with acute 
myocardial infarction (AMI, or heart attack) that die in the hospital. We focus on this particular 
diagnostic for several reasons. First, because death is a generally accepted quality measure and 
it is a relatively common outcome for heart attacks. Second, AMI cases are not immediately 
fatal if the patient is rapidly admitted to a hospital and, hence, the hospital intervention is 
crucial. Finally, this measure of hospital quality has already been used in the literature 
(McClellan and Staiger, 2000). 
When looking at whether there is a trade-off between quality and quantity of charity care 
provided by hospitals, we will look at the change in the proportion of AMI patients who died in 
the hospital. Due to the technology improvements between 1985 and 1995, for the average 
hospital in California in 1995 the amount of patients dying of AMI was lower than the 
proportion that died in 1985. We will consider that a hospital experiences a worsening of the 
quality of its care if the improvement on AMI survival is lower than in the baseline case. Data 
comes from the OSHPD.  
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Hospital characteristics: One of the main elements to take into account is whether a hospital 
belongs to the safety net. Mas (2009) found that government hospitals, teaching hospitals and 
hospitals located in poor areas had a higher burden of charity care and were also the ones that 
provided care to a higher proportion of Medicaid
7 patients. We will use a dummy for each one 
of those hospital types. 
To determine if a hospital belongs to a poor neighborhood, we establish a ranking of the 
average income per capita in all the zip codes in California to determine the level 
corresponding to the thirty-third percentile. Then we compute the average per capita income for 
the five-mile radius area surrounding the hospital. If it lies below the thirty-third percentile 
level for the corresponding state, the hospital is considered to be located in a poor 
neighborhood. 
Hospital data on public ownership and teaching status come form the American Hospital 
Association (AHA). We also include a dummy variable indicating whether the hospital is for 
profit or not-for-profit and we control for hospital size measured by the number of beds. 
Finally, previous work has also found that managed care has a different effect for those 
hospitals that are the only ones of their type in the MSA, especially if they are the only public 
hospital in the metropolitan area. We will, then, define a dummy variably ONLY that is equal to 
one if the hospital if the only one of its type in the MSA. 
Demographic characteristics: They include the logarithm of the average family income in the 
MSA, the percentage of population older than 65, the percentage of uninsured in the MSA and 
the percentage of the MSA population with Medicaid and Medicare. The demographic 
information comes from the Current Population Survey (CPS). 
IV. Methods and Results 
Testing whether Patients Shift to Public Hospitals where Managed Care is Stronger 
Previous work has already shown that managed care leads to hospital closure, especially of 
safety net hospitals. It has also found that managed care encourages the closure of those 
services most commonly used by the uninsured. All these facts could lead to a worsening of 
their access to health care. However, for this to be the case we should be sure that charity care 
patients do not shift to other types of hospitals in areas where managed care is stronger. In 
order to determine whether charity care patients are shifting to public hospitals when managed 
care enrollment increases, we will look at the effect that managed care enrollment has on the 
share of the overall MSA charity care patients who go to each hospital. In particular, our 
dependent variable is the change of the percentage of the overall MSA charity care patients 
who go each hospital between 1985 and 1995 (Yi). We also look at alternative measure of 
charity care, since some argue that Medi-Cal
8 patients should also be considered. 
According to our hypothesis, the change in the proportion of charity care patients that a 
hospital has might depend on several relevant variables: on the evolution of managed care 
                                              
7 Program funded by the federal government and the states whose goal is to provide health care to low income citizens.  
8 Medicaid program in California.  
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penetration (HMO); on whether the hospital is in the safety net – government hospital (G), 
teaching hospital (T) or hospital located in a poor area (P), on hospital variables (SIZEi) or on 
the demographic characteristics of the area (DEM). Moreover, managed care might have a 
different effect for different types of hospitals. Actually, it has already been established that it 
has a stronger effect for the closures of hospitals and certain services for the safety net. Hence 
we will also include the interactions of managed care enrollment and hospital type. Finally, we 
also control for the possibility that a hospital that is the only (ONLY) one of its type in the 
whole metropolitan area might behave differently. For instance, if it is a public hospital, it 
might face strong pressure to remain open even if it is under financial stress. Hence, we will 
also interact the ONLY dummy by each hospital type. 
Our empirical strategy uses the following specification: 
l i i i i i i i msa l i i i
i i msa i i msa i i msa i msa i
G ONLY T ONLY P ONLY ONLY DEM SIZE G T P
G HMO T HMO P HMO HMO e CharityCar Proportion
ε ψ ν ϕ λ η γ ρ ω θ
δ β α φ
+ + + + + + + + +
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆
* * *
* * * ) ( , , , ,
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i i msa i i msa i i msa i msa i
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ε ψ ν ϕ λ η γ ρ ω θ
δ β α φ
+ + + + + + + + +
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆
* * *
* * * ) ( , , , ,
 
In this specification, the baseline hospital is a non-traditional safety net one (non-government, 
non-teaching, and not located in poor areas). 
Results of the OLS regressions are presented in Table 1. The corresponding instrumental 
variable output is presented in Table A1 of the Appendix. The results are consistent. The first 
conclusion from Table 1 is that that managed care enrollment has a significantly negative 
effect on the share of the overall MSA charity care provided by the non-safety net hospitals. 
The second conclusion is that our results confirm the Currie and Fahr (2001) findings and show 
that, as managed care penetration increases, a larger proportion of the MSA charity care is 
provided by government hospitals. In column [1], we can see that HMO penetration has a clear 
positive effect on the charity care market share for government hospitals. For instance, a one 
standard deviation increase in HMO enrollment would lead to a 63% higher rise in the share of 
MSA uninsured care provided by government hospitals between 1985 and 1995 than in the 
baseline non safety net hospitals. 
The second columns of Table 1 looks at the effect of the growth managed care enrollment on 
the proportion of the MSA Medi-Cal patients served in each hospital. The conclusions are 
similar: Medi-Cal patients tend to concentrate more in government hospitals in areas where 
managed care penetration is stronger. Moreover, here, the effect of being the only government 
hospital in the metropolitan area is positive and significant. Finally, Column [3] of Table 1 
considers as charity care both the Medi-Cal and uninsured patients. In this case a one standard 
deviation increase in HMO enrollment leads to a 38% higher rise in the share of charity care 
provided by government hospitals than in the baseline ones. 
Table 1 confirms that public hospitals in metropolitan areas where managed care penetration is 
larger serve a bigger proportion of the MSA uninsured.  
Managed Care Effect on the Quality of Care Provided by Safety Net Hospitals 
The concentration of uninsured in public hospitals in areas with higher HMO could have important 
financial consequences for these hospitals, since now they serve a higher number of non-paying 
patients using (in the best case scenario) the same revenues. Our second hypothesis suggests the 
possibility of a trade-off between quantity of charity care and quality of care provided. Here we will 
look at whether the quality of care provided by government hospitals – which are now providing  
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more charity care than before – has worsened with respect to the baseline case in areas where 
managed care enrollment has increased more. 
As we explained in section III, our measure of hospital quality of care is the proportion of 
patients who die after a heart attack. Ceteris paribus, all other things being equal, a higher 
proportion would indicate that the quality is worse. One should take into account that, due to 
technological change, the number of patients who die after a heart attack has decreased over 
time. Hence, when we say that the quality of a hospital has worsened, what we mean is that the 
proportion of patients who die after an AMI has improved less than in the baseline case. 
To analyze the effect that the increase in managed care has had on the quality of public 
hospitals, our dependent variable will be the change in the proportion of patients who die after 
a heart attack (AMI).  
Discharge data tell us whether the patient left the hospital dead or alive. However, one always 
has to consider the possibility of some hospitals discharging their patients early, which could 
led them to simply dying at home instead of at the hospital. In order to address this concern, 
we will look also at those patients who left the hospital after five days or fewer. Finally, one 
should also take into account that not all hospitals are equally prepared to treat a heart attack 
and that it might simply be the case that, where there is more managed care, more hospitals 
have closed their intensive care cardiac units (this is not what Mas, 2009, finds, but we should 
still make sure that this possibility does not distort the results). If this were the case, one could 
argue that what happens is that, where there is more managed care, there is a higher probability 
that the patient gets taken to the “wrong” hospital type (without cardiac intensive care) after a 
heart attack. In order to take this into account, we will also present our results including only 
those hospitals that have a cardiac intensive care unit. 
Our empirical strategy uses the following specification: 
l i i i i i i i msa l i i i
i i msa i i msa i i msa i msa i
G ONLY T ONLY P ONLY ONLY DEM SIZE G T P
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+ + + + + + + + +
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* * *
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Table 2 presents the results. Note that, since the dependent variable is the change in the 
percentage of patients who die, a positive coefficient indicates a worsening of the hospital 
quality. 
The first and second columns include all the urban non-federal general hospitals in California. 
The third and fourth ones include only the hospitals that have intensive cardiac care units as 
reported in the AHA Annual Survey. Columns 1 and 3 report the OLS coefficients and columns 
2 and 4 include the IV instrumental variables results. They are consistent. 
The first two columns of Table 2 show that, in areas where managed care enrollment has 
increased more, government hospitals have experienced a lower improvement in their quality 
than the rest of hospitals. Compared to the baseline, a standard deviation increase of the HMO 
enrollment between 1985 and 1995 would imply that the improvement in quality as between 
these years is 27% lower in government hospitals. 
These results remain when we consider only the proportion of patients who die after an AMI 
and that have been admitted to hospitals that have specialized cardiac units. The OLS and the 
IV results are reported in columns [3] and [4]. Interestingly in this case, the results also show 
that the rise in the relative proportion of patients who die after a heart attack in government  
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hospitals compared to the baseline is of particular severity if it is the only public hospital in the 
MSA. In Table 1, we saw that these hospitals were receiving even more charity care patients. 
Finally, these results are consistent with those obtained when we considered only those patients 
who have stayed in the hospital fewer than six days after suffering an AMI. They are reported 
in columns 1b, 2b, 3b and 4b. Columns 1b and 2b include all the hospitals and columns 3b and 
4b contain only those hospitals with cardiac intensive care units. The coefficients for the 
interaction of change in HMO enrollment and the government hospital dummy are still positive 
and significant indicating that government hospitals have worsened their quality between 1985 
and 1995 in areas where managed care is growing more. 
These results seem to indicate that there is a trade-off between the number of charity care 
patients and the quality of care provided. The effect of an increase in managed care penetration 
is stronger for public hospitals, which are precisely the ones that have been receiving a larger 
share of the charity care patients in the metropolitan area. 
Managed Care Impact on the Health of the Uninsured. Who Gets Hurt? 
So far we have been using hospital data. The two previous findings help us understand the path 
through which managed care can have a negative effect on the health of the uninsured: its 
financial pressures encourage charity care patients to concentrate in public hospitals. Those, in 
turn, face the challenge of providing health care to a higher proportion of non-paying patients. 
Our results hint towards the possibility of a trade-off between hospitals’ quantity of non-paying 
charity care and the quality of the care they provide.   
The final remaining question is to see whether managed care has a negative effect only for the 
uninsured patients or also for all the patients who keep using these overstretched hospitals. To 
test this, we will use patient data and we will consider only those patients who had been 
diagnosed with AMI. The OSHPD contains information on all patient discharges in California 
(about 3.6 million per year), of which 48,121 patients were admitted with AMI in 1985 and 
41,104 in 1995. Of them 15.2% died in 1985 and 11.8% died in 1995. We will compare the 
situation of the uninsured in 1985 – when managed care was still a relatively rare phenomenon 
in many Californian MSAs – with their situation in 1995, when managed care was very 
widespread and had already affected the competition in the whole healthcare marketplace. 
The dependent variable consists of a dummy (DIED) equal to one if the patient died after the 
heart attack and zero otherwise. We want to see whether managed care affects only 
the uninsured or all the patients who go to the safety net hospitals, which are now facing 
stronger financial pressures and a possible trade-off between quality and quantity of care. For 
this we will control for the patient’s insurance status (UC dummy) and also for the type of 
hospital she goes to – government (G); teaching (T), hospital located in a poor area (P). We are 
interested in analyzing whether managed care enrollment affects the uninsured or the safety 
net hospitals more severely. For this we will also include a measure of HMO enrollment and we 
will interact it with the patient’s insurance status and the type of hospital she goes to. We will 
also include a time dummy because, as we have previously explained, we expect managed care 
to have a stronger effect in 1995, when it had already had an impact in the whole health 
care market, affecting not only the wages and revenues of those professionals and hospitals 
working with managed care organizations, but also those in the whole market. Finally, we will 
also control for some hospital characteristics (size, type), MSA characteristics (MSA population 
enrolled in Medicare, Medicaid and uninsured) and individual demographic characteristics  
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(DEM). All the demographic variables will also be interacted with each other to control for the 
fact that there might be some particular effects for a certain age-sex-race group. Unfortunately, 
the OSHPD only has information on sex and age
9 characteristics, but not on the income level of 
the patients. However, we have information on their zip codes. We will include the following 
Zip demographic variables (ZIP): the average population, the average family income, the 
proportion of people with a high school degree, the percentage of families in poverty, 
the percentage of unemployed and a POORZIP dummy equal to one if the average per capita 
income of the ZIP code is below the thirty-third percentile level for California. 
The first specification looks at whether managed care penetration has a positive effect on the 
probability of dying after a heart attack for the uninsured. We are aware that the probability of 
dying for the uninsured is generally higher; what we want to see is whether managed care 
diffusion has a differential effect on this probability for the uninsured, and this is why we need 
to interact the two variables. 
For this we use the following expression: 
 
zip msa i i i t msa
t msa i t msa i t msa zip msa i
ZIP DEM MSA UC HMO
HMO UC HMO UC HMO died
, , ,
, , , , ,
1995
1995 * * 1995 * *
ε θ η λ ϕ φ δ
χ β α
+ + + + + + ∆ +
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ =
 
The probit coefficients are presented in the first column of Table 3. In order to control for 
robustness we also ran the OLS specification, and we also instrumented HMO penetration by the 
average firm size of the MSA. The coefficients obtained are consistent with the probit ones. 
Finally, we also ran the same specifications including only those patients who suffered from a 
heart attack and stayed in the hospital for five days or fewer. The results are robust and 
presented at Table A.2 in the Appendix. The results are consistent and show a positive effect of 
HMO penetration on the probability of dying of heart attack for the uninsured. 
The probit results in Table 1.9 imply that a charity care patient in 1995 from an MSA that had the 
average HMO penetration of 0.398 would have a 3.6% higher probability of dying than an 
insured patient. If the HMO enrollment had been one standard deviation lower, a charity care 
patient in 1995 would have had a probability of dying of a heart attack 2% higher than an 
insured patient. These are considerable numbers if we take into account that the average 
probability of dying of a heart attack in 1995 was 11.8%. The charity care dummy is significantly 
positive, indicating that the uninsured have a higher probability of dying after a heart attack. 
Also, the year 1995 dummy is significantly negative, reflecting the improvement in medical 
technology during the decade under consideration, which has allowed the probability of dying of 
heart attack to decrease from 15.2% in 1985 to 11.8% in 1995. 
These results confirm the fact that HMO penetration has a negative impact on the health of the 
uninsured. However, the negative impact could be due to their worse access to care or also to 
the fact that they now go to government hospitals, which in turn have worse quality. Hence, if 
these are the mechanisms by which managed care leads to worse health outcomes, not only the 
uninsured, but also those living in poor areas and those going to government hospitals, can 
suffer worse health. 
                                              
9 I only include these patients who are 35 or older because there are almost no cases of heart attack for younger 
patients. I consider nine different age groups (pre-determined by my data):35-44 years old, 45-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65-
69, 70-74, 75-79, 80-84, and 85 or older.  
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In order to analyze if managed care also affects the health of the people living in poor areas, 
I use the following specification: 
msa zip i i i t msa
t msa msa t msa msa t msa zip msa i
ZIP DEM MSA P HMO
HMO P HMO P HMO died
, , ,
, , , , ,
1995
1995 * * 1995 * *
ε θ η λ ϕ φ δ
χ β α
+ + + + + + ∆ +
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ =
 
where P is a dummy variable equal to one if the patient lives in a poor are (an area whose 
average income per capita is below the thirty-third percentile level for California). The rest of 
the variables are defined as before. 
The second column in Table 3 presents the probit coefficients. The OLS coefficients and the 
instrumental variables specification as well as the results including only these patients staying 
in the hospital for five days or fewer are robust and are included in Table A.3 in the Appendix. 
The probit coefficients imply that a patient who lived in a poor neighborhood in 1995 in an 
MSA that had the average HMO penetration of 0.398 would have a 0.8% higher probability of 
dying than a patient living in a non-poor area. However, if the HMO penetration had been one 
standard deviation lower instead, a patient living in a poor neighborhood in 1995 would have 
had almost the same probability of dying (0.1% lower) as a patient living in a rich area. The 
charity care dummy is significantly positive, indicating that the uninsured have a 2.8% higher 
probability of dying after a heart attack than the insured. Again, the year dummy for 1995 is 
significantly negative, reflecting the medical improvements for heart attack treatment during 
the decade under consideration. 
Another reason for managed care penetration leading to worse health outcomes for the 
uninsured could be the fact that, with the increase in price competition, charity care patients 
shift to government hospitals (Table 1), which in turn experience a worsening of their quality in 
areas where managed care penetration is stronger (Table 2). If this is the case, then we should 
expect managed care to affect all the patients who are treated in government hospitals 
independently of their insurance status. In order to test if this is the case, we use the following 
specification: 
 
where G corresponds to a dummy variable that is one if the patient goes to a government 
hospital and zero otherwise. The rest of the variables are defined as previously indicated. 
The third column in Table 3 presents the probit results. The OLS and instrumental variables 
specification are included in Table A.4 in the Appendix. The coefficients from the probit imply 
that a person going to a government hospital in 1995 after suffering a heart attack (and using 
the average HMO penetration for 1995 in California) had a 2.1% higher probability of dying 
than those patients going to other kinds of hospitals. A one standard deviation lower HMO 
penetration would mean only a 0.1% higher probability of dying for these going to government 
hospitals compared to patients who go to other hospital types. This effect remains more severe 
for the charity care patients. 
Hence, managed care penetration has a negative impact on the three groups of patients: those 
living in poor areas, the uninsured and patients going to government hospitals. However, these 
groups are not mutually exclusive. It could be the case that we observe a worsening of the 
health outcomes of those going to government hospitals, just because most of them are poor 
 
msa zip i i h t msa
t msa h t msa h t msa zip msa h i
ZIP DEM MSA G HMO
HMO G HMO G HMO died
, , ,
, , , , , ,
1995
1995 * * 1995 * *
ε θ η λ ϕ φ δ
χ β α
+ + + + + + ∆ +
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = 
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and what we am picking up is the impact of managed care penetration on the health of the 
poor. A similar reasoning could be made for the uninsured. 
In order to determine which of the groups is affected by managed care penetration, in the final 
specification we include all three interactions with managed care penetration. The probit results 
are presented in the last column of Table 3. The coefficients for HMO*charity*1995, 
HMO*poor*1995 and HMO*gov*1995 are all positive and significant. Taking into account all 
the relevant coefficients, a charity care patient in 1995 in an MSA with the average 1995 HMO 
penetration has a 3.3% higher probability of dying than an insured patient. A patient who goes 
to a government hospital has a 2.5% higher probability of dying than somebody who goes to 
another type of hospital. However, people who live in poor areas have almost the same 
probability of dying (0.08% lower) as people living in other neighborhoods, after controlling for 
being uninsured and going to government hospitals. 
Hence, regarding the effect of managed care penetration on health outcomes – as measured by 
their probability of dying after a heart attack – we can conclude that managed care has a 
negative impact on the health care outcomes of charity care patients and those who go 
to government hospitals. Our results also indicate that the impact on the health of those living 
in poor areas, after controlling for their insurance status and the kind of hospital they go to, is 
negligible. 
V. Conclusions 
Managed care penetration has often been blamed for increasing financial pressures on hospitals 
and some previous work has confirmed that HMO enrollment had a particularly negative effect 
for the survival of the safety net hospitals and also for the provision of the type of services 
most commonly used by the uninsured. 
Our goal in this paper is to test whether managed care has also had any effect on the health of 
the uninsured population. 
Our findings help us understand the path through which managed care can have a negative 
effect on the health of the uninsured: its financial pressures encourage charity care patients to 
concentrate in public hospitals. Those, in turn, face the challenge of providing health care to a 
higher proportion of non-paying patients. Our results hint towards the possibility of a trade-off 
between hospitals’ quantity of non-paying charity care and the quality of the care they provide. 
Finally, regarding the effect of managed care penetration in health outcomes – as measured by 
patients’ probability of dying after a heart attack – we can conclude that managed care has a 
negative impact on the health care outcomes of charity care patients and those who go to 
government hospitals. 
These results bring a new perspective to managed care. Its impact on American health should 
be analyzed beyond the efficiency implications and more research should be conducted 
regarding its effects on the overall health care market.  
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Table 1 
Managed Care Effects on the Provision of Charity Care in California 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES Ch%MSA UC Provided  Ch%MSA MCal Provided  Ch.%MSA UC&MCal Provided 
[1] [2] [3]
HMO change -0,005** 0,004 -0,003**
[0,001] [0,003] [0,001]
HMO change*poor 0,0595 1,406 0,533
[0,195] [1,295] [0,496]
HMO change*teaching 0,326** 0,096 -0,002
[0,098] [0,774] [0,404]
HMO change * gov 4.140* 6,230* 2,501*
[2.644] [3,334] [1.330]
Poor 0,695 -6,151 -3,152
[0,888] [3,962] [3,014]
Teaching -0,928*   -10,701* -4,833*
[0,518] [6,075] [2,562]
Government -0,122 -3,461** -1,346
[0,321] [1,485] [1,002]
Only hospital -1,010** -2,746 -1,726*
[0,462] [1,754] [1,070]
Only hospital*poor 0,069 7,957* 4,171
[1,109] [4,694] [3,352]
Only hospital*Teaching 1,104 3,028 4,393
[1.554] [6,946] [3,097]
Only hospital*gov 0,371 9.211** 1,653
[1.353] [4.240] [1,834]
Demographics  yes yes yes
Hospital Characteristics yes yes yes
N 210 210 210
R2 0,202 0,271 0,292
UC refers to uncompensated care and Mcal to Medi-Cal. 
Robust standard errors appear in brackets.
* Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level.  
* *Statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES Ch%MSA UC Provided  Ch%MSA MCal Provided  Ch.%MSA UC&MCal Provided  DEPENDENT VARIABLES Ch%MSA UC Provided  Ch%MSA MCal Provided  Ch.%MSA UC&MCal Provided 
[1] [2] [3]
HMO change -0,005** 0,004 -0,003**
[0,001] [0,003] [0,001]
HMO change*poor 0,0595 1,406 0,533
[0,195] [1,295] [0,496]
HMO change*teaching 0,326** 0,096 -0,002
[0,098] [0,774] [0,404]
HMO change * gov 4.140* 6,230* 2,501*
[2.644] [3,334] [1.330]
Poor 0,695 -6,151 -3,152
[0,888] [3,962] [3,014]
Teaching -0,928*   -10,701* -4,833*
[0,518] [6,075] [2,562]
Government -0,122 -3,461** -1,346
[0,321] [1,485] [1,002]
Only hospital -1,010** -2,746 -1,726*
[0,462] [1,754] [1,070]
Only hospital*poor 0,069 7,957* 4,171
[1,109] [4,694] [3,352]
Only hospital*Teaching 1,104 3,028 4,393
[1.554] [6,946] [3,097]
Only hospital*gov 0,371 9.211** 1,653
[1.353] [4.240] [1,834]
Demographics  yes yes yes
Hospital Characteristics yes yes yes
N 210 210 210
R2 0,202 0,271 0,292
UC refers to uncompensated care and Mcal to Medi-Cal. 
Robust standard errors appear in brackets.
* Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level.  
* *Statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  
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Table 2 
Managed Care Effects on Quality for California 








[1] [2] [3] [4] [1b] [2b] [3b] [4b]
length of stay <6 days
HMO Change -7,240** -2,64* -2,140* -2,400 -1,580 -1,528 -1,691 -4,651
[3,82] [1,571] [1,280] [2,780] [1,410] [2,315] [2,330] [5,131]
HMO change*poor 0,016 0,055 0,030* -0,048 0,083 0,229 -0,091* 0,022
[0,021] [0,115] [0,017] [0,075] [0,085] [0,364] [0,030] [0,175]
HMO change*teaching -0,007 0,271 0,011 -0,060 0,045 0,820 0,0811* 0,211
[0,018] [0,180] [0,030] [0,127] [0,064] [0,692] [0,049] [0,252]
HMO change * gov 2,421* 8,280* 3,246* 1,46** 6,471* 3,009* 8,341** 9,263*
[1,310] [4,840] [1,728] [0,635] [3,898] [1,749] [2,614] [5,293]
Poor -0,209** -0,309 -0,163** -0,108 -0,212 -0,573 0,011 -0,132
[0,063] [0,210] [0,059] [0,106] [0,168] 0,687 [0,113] [0,257]
Teaching -0,237** -0,552** -0,192** -0,132* -0,638** -1,578* -0,525** -0,501**
[0,081] [0,206] [0,070] [0,077] [0,218] [0,963] [0,124] [0,132]
Government 0,044 -2,63 -0,084 -0,279** 0,492 -0,312 -0,048 -0,231
[0,130] [0,233] [0,054] [0,102] [0,618] [0,687] [0,090] [0,177]
Only hospital -0,272 -0,166 -0,373** -0,526** 0,138 -0,238 -0,358 -0,554*
[0,383] [0,260] [0,108] [0,133] [0,440] [0,538] [0,267] [0,296]
Only hospital*poor 0,233 0,539 0,449** 0,417** 0,311 0,885 0,469* 0,716
[0,357] [0,385] [0,121] [0,186] [0,470] [1,150] [0,280] [0,451]
Only hospital*Teaching -0,298 -0,113 -0,190 -0,435 0,142 0,807 0,824** 0,398
[0,379] [0,518] [0,329] [0,362] [0,932] [4,401] [0,378] [0,562]
Only hospital*gov 0,286 0,265 0,527** 0,978** 1,019 -0,461 -0,086 0,406
[0,490] [0,505] [0,329] [0,338] [0,996] [1,108] [0,450] [0,569]
Demographic Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Hospital Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 210 210 166 166 209 209 166 166
R2 0,166 0,238 0,288 0,183 0,370 0,319 0,298 0,199
(1) Includes all urban hospitals in California.
(2) The same as (1) instrumenting HMO penetration by average firm size in the MSA.
(3)FOR HOSPITAL WITH CARDIAC INTENSIVE CARE.
(4) The same as (3) instrumenting HMO penetration by average firm size in the MSA.
[1b],[2b],[3b] and [4b] The same as (1), (2), (3) and(4) limiting the sample to these patients that stay at the hospital five or less days.
Robust standard errors appear in brackets.
* Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level.











[1] [2] [3] [4] [1b] [2b] [3b] [4b]
length of stay <6 days
HMO Change -7,240** -2,64* -2,140* -2,400 -1,580 -1,528 -1,691 -4,651
[3,82] [1,571] [1,280] [2,780] [1,410] [2,315] [2,330] [5,131]
HMO change*poor 0,016 0,055 0,030* -0,048 0,083 0,229 -0,091* 0,022
[0,021] [0,115] [0,017] [0,075] [0,085] [0,364] [0,030] [0,175]
HMO change*teaching -0,007 0,271 0,011 -0,060 0,045 0,820 0,0811* 0,211
[0,018] [0,180] [0,030] [0,127] [0,064] [0,692] [0,049] [0,252]
HMO change * gov 2,421* 8,280* 3,246* 1,46** 6,471* 3,009* 8,341** 9,263*
[1,310] [4,840] [1,728] [0,635] [3,898] [1,749] [2,614] [5,293]
Poor -0,209** -0,309 -0,163** -0,108 -0,212 -0,573 0,011 -0,132
[0,063] [0,210] [0,059] [0,106] [0,168] 0,687 [0,113] [0,257]
Teaching -0,237** -0,552** -0,192** -0,132* -0,638** -1,578* -0,525** -0,501**
[0,081] [0,206] [0,070] [0,077] [0,218] [0,963] [0,124] [0,132]
Government 0,044 -2,63 -0,084 -0,279** 0,492 -0,312 -0,048 -0,231
[0,130] [0,233] [0,054] [0,102] [0,618] [0,687] [0,090] [0,177]
Only hospital -0,272 -0,166 -0,373** -0,526** 0,138 -0,238 -0,358 -0,554*
[0,383] [0,260] [0,108] [0,133] [0,440] [0,538] [0,267] [0,296]
Only hospital*poor 0,233 0,539 0,449** 0,417** 0,311 0,885 0,469* 0,716
[0,357] [0,385] [0,121] [0,186] [0,470] [1,150] [0,280] [0,451]
Only hospital*Teaching -0,298 -0,113 -0,190 -0,435 0,142 0,807 0,824** 0,398
[0,379] [0,518] [0,329] [0,362] [0,932] [4,401] [0,378] [0,562]
Only hospital*gov 0,286 0,265 0,527** 0,978** 1,019 -0,461 -0,086 0,406
[0,490] [0,505] [0,329] [0,338] [0,996] [1,108] [0,450] [0,569]
Demographic Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Hospital Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 210 210 166 166 209 209 166 166
R2 0,166 0,238 0,288 0,183 0,370 0,319 0,298 0,199
(1) Includes all urban hospitals in California.
(2) The same as (1) instrumenting HMO penetration by average firm size in the MSA.
(3)FOR HOSPITAL WITH CARDIAC INTENSIVE CARE.
(4) The same as (3) instrumenting HMO penetration by average firm size in the MSA.
[1b],[2b],[3b] and [4b] The same as (1), (2), (3) and(4) limiting the sample to these patients that stay at the hospital five or less days.
Robust standard errors appear in brackets.
* Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
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Table 3 
Who Gets Hurt by Managed Care?  
Probit Regressions 
Dependent Variable: dummy equal to 1 if the heart attack patient died in the hospital and 0 otherwise 
Robust standard errors appear in brackets.
* Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
* *Statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
*** statistically signifficant at 1% level.
All regressions include the following Demographic Variables: race/ethnicity dummies (African American, Asian, Hispanic, Native American),
male dummy, age (8 age groups starting at age 35), age and race interactions, age and sex interactions, race and sex interactions.
Charity is a dummy equal to one if the patient receives charity care, poor is a dummy equal to 1 if the patient lives in a poor area.




































































































N 71080 71080 71080 71080
R2 0.175 0.175 0.178 0.112
Robust standard errors appear in brackets.
* Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
* *Statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
*** statistically signifficant at 1% level.
All regressions include the following Demographic Variables: race/ethnicity dummies (African American, Asian, Hispanic, Native American),
male dummy, age (8 age groups starting at age 35), age and race interactions, age and sex interactions, race and sex interactions.
Charity is a dummy equal to one if the patient receives charity care, poor is a dummy equal to 1 if the patient lives in a poor area.




































































































N 71080 71080 71080 71080
R2 0.175 0.175 0.178 0.112
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Appendix 
Table A.1 
Managed Care Effects on the Provision of Charity Care in California 
Instrumental Variables 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES Ch%MSA UC Provided  Ch%MSA MCal Provided  Ch.%MSA UC&MCal Provided 
[1] [2] [3]
HMO change -0,015* 0,102 -0,045*
[0,009] [0,123] [0,026]
HMO change*poor 0,979 -0,423 -0,331
[0,688] [1,594] [1,253]
HMO change*teaching 1,339* 0,198 0,587
[0,765] [0,730] [0,529]
HMO change * gov 3,750* 2,136* 1,959**
[2,045] [1,186] [0,980]
Poor -0,592 -2,453 -1,440
[1,018] [2,993] [1,356]
Teaching -1,410 -9,491* -4,838
[0,805] [5,752] [2,680]
Government 0,530 1,128 0,660
[1,312] [0,970] [0,716]
Only hospital -0,976 0,144 -0,429
[0,591] [0,699] [0,513]
Only hospital*poor 2,057 1,714 1,271
[1,649] [3,213] [1,316]
Only hospital*Teaching 1,548 2,619 4,529
[2,451] [7,229] [3,129]
Only hospital*gov -0,615 3,746 -0,833
[2,374] [4,518] [1,679]
Demographics  yes yes yes
Hospital Characteristics yes yes yes
N 210 210 210
R2 0,193 0,139 0,184
UC refers to uncompensated care and Mcal to Medi-Cal.
Robust standard errors appear in brackets.
Managed care enrollment has been instrumented  by firm size.
* Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level.  * *Statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES Ch%MSA UC Provided  Ch%MSA MCal Provided  Ch.%MSA UC&MCal Provided 
[1] [2] [3]
HMO change -0,015* 0,102 -0,045*
[0,009] [0,123] [0,026]
HMO change*poor 0,979 -0,423 -0,331
[0,688] [1,594] [1,253]
HMO change*teaching 1,339* 0,198 0,587
[0,765] [0,730] [0,529]
HMO change * gov 3,750* 2,136* 1,959**
[2,045] [1,186] [0,980]
Poor -0,592 -2,453 -1,440
[1,018] [2,993] [1,356]
Teaching -1,410 -9,491* -4,838
[0,805] [5,752] [2,680]
Government 0,530 1,128 0,660
[1,312] [0,970] [0,716]
Only hospital -0,976 0,144 -0,429
[0,591] [0,699] [0,513]
Only hospital*poor 2,057 1,714 1,271
[1,649] [3,213] [1,316]
Only hospital*Teaching 1,548 2,619 4,529
[2,451] [7,229] [3,129]
Only hospital*gov -0,615 3,746 -0,833
[2,374] [4,518] [1,679]
Demographics  yes yes yes
Hospital Characteristics yes yes yes
N 210 210 210
R2 0,193 0,139 0,184
UC refers to uncompensated care and Mcal to Medi-Cal.
Robust standard errors appear in brackets.
Managed care enrollment has been instrumented  by firm size.
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Table A.2 
Impact of HMO Penetration on the Uninsured’s Health 
Dependent Variable: Change in the Proportion of Patients with Heart Attack that Died 
Length of stay<6 days
[1] [2] [3] [1b] [2b] [3b]
HMO*Charity*1995 0.117* 0.235*** 0.136* 0.358*** 0.441*** 0.258*
[0.060] [0.074] [0.078] [0.073] [0.092] [0.141]
HMO*Charity -0,006 -0.086*** 0,001 -0.281*** -0.390*** -0.184***
[0.026] [0.028] [0.030] [0.042] [0.046] [0.047]
HMO*1995 -0,012 -0.094** -0,025 -0.062* -0.154* -0.095***
[0.020] [0.046] [0.019] [0.031] [0.080] [0.029]
Charity*1995 -0,028 -0.076** -0,043 0,016 -0,020 -0,015
[0.022] [0.029] [0.027] [0.026] [0.036] [0.052]
Charity care 0.019*** 0.018** 0.025*** 0.014* 0.040** 0.029***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009]
Year 1995 -0.046*** 0,022 -0.039*** -0.209*** -0.095* -0.185***
[0.008] [0.030] [0.007] [0.011] [0.051] [0.014]
HMO penetration -0,014 -0.138* -0,013 0,032 -0.348** 0,030
[0.015] [0.075] [0.014] [0.028] [0.128] [0.022]
Poor -0,007 -0,010 -0,006 -0,005 -0,009 -0,003
[0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007]
N 71080 71080 71080 34784 34784 34784
R2 0,331 0,334 0,175 0,353 0,365 0,185
Charity is a dummy equal to one if the patient receives charity care, poor is a dummy equal to 1 if the patient lives in a poor area. 
(1) OLS regression, (2) with IV instrumenting HMO penetration by firm size, (3) probit. (1)b, (2)b, (3)b are the same regressions but
including only these patients that stay in the hospital five days or less. 
1995 is a dummy equal to 1 if year==1995 and 0 if year==1985.
Robust standard errors appear in brackets.
* Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
* *Statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
*** statistically signifficant at 1% level.
All regressions include the following Demographic Variables: race/ethnicity dummies (African American, Asian, Hispanic, Native American),
male dummy, age (8 age groups starting at age 35), age and race interactions, age and sex interactions, race and sex interactions.
All regressions include the following Zip Variables: percentage in poverty, percentage unemployed, percentage with high school or more,
population. The following MSA variables are also included: HMO penetration, MCR penetration, MCD penetration and percentage of uninsured.
For the previous MSA variables I included both their level in 1985 and the change berween 1985 and 1995.
Length of stay<6 days
[1] [2] [3] [1b] [2b] [3b]
HMO*Charity*1995 0.117* 0.235*** 0.136* 0.358*** 0.441*** 0.258*
[0.060] [0.074] [0.078] [0.073] [0.092] [0.141]
HMO*Charity -0,006 -0.086*** 0,001 -0.281*** -0.390*** -0.184***
[0.026] [0.028] [0.030] [0.042] [0.046] [0.047]
HMO*1995 -0,012 -0.094** -0,025 -0.062* -0.154* -0.095***
[0.020] [0.046] [0.019] [0.031] [0.080] [0.029]
Charity*1995 -0,028 -0.076** -0,043 0,016 -0,020 -0,015
[0.022] [0.029] [0.027] [0.026] [0.036] [0.052]
Charity care 0.019*** 0.018** 0.025*** 0.014* 0.040** 0.029***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009]
Year 1995 -0.046*** 0,022 -0.039*** -0.209*** -0.095* -0.185***
[0.008] [0.030] [0.007] [0.011] [0.051] [0.014]
HMO penetration -0,014 -0.138* -0,013 0,032 -0.348** 0,030
[0.015] [0.075] [0.014] [0.028] [0.128] [0.022]
Poor -0,007 -0,010 -0,006 -0,005 -0,009 -0,003
[0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007]
N 71080 71080 71080 34784 34784 34784
R2 0,331 0,334 0,175 0,353 0,365 0,185
Charity is a dummy equal to one if the patient receives charity care, poor is a dummy equal to 1 if the patient lives in a poor area. 
(1) OLS regression, (2) with IV instrumenting HMO penetration by firm size, (3) probit. (1)b, (2)b, (3)b are the same regressions but
including only these patients that stay in the hospital five days or less. 
1995 is a dummy equal to 1 if year==1995 and 0 if year==1985.
Robust standard errors appear in brackets.
* Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
* *Statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
*** statistically signifficant at 1% level.
All regressions include the following Demographic Variables: race/ethnicity dummies (African American, Asian, Hispanic, Native American),
male dummy, age (8 age groups starting at age 35), age and race interactions, age and sex interactions, race and sex interactions.
All regressions include the following Zip Variables: percentage in poverty, percentage unemployed, percentage with high school or more,
population. The following MSA variables are also included: HMO penetration, MCR penetration, MCD penetration and percentage of uninsured.
For the previous MSA variables I included both their level in 1985 and the change berween 1985 and 1995. 
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Table A.3 
Impact of HMO Penetration on the Health of Heart Attack Patients 
Living in Poor Neighborhoods 
Dependent Variable: dummy equal to 1 if the heart attack patient died in the hospital and 0 otherwise 
Length of stay<6 days
[1] [2] [3] [1b] [2b] [3b]
HMO*poor*1995 0.070* 0.159** 0.076** 0,030 0,105 0,057
[0.042] [0.063] [0.042] [0.068] [0.108] [0.065]
HMO*poor -0,041 -0,068 -0.004** -0,029 -0,006 -0,025
[0.027] [0.043] [0.002] [0.056] [0.093] [0.040]
HMO*1995 -0,029 -0.118** -0.043** -0,048 -0,131 -0.098**
[0.023] [0.050] [0.022] [0.035] [0.087] [0.033]
Poor*1995 -0,024 -0.068*** -0.024** -0,014 -0,057 -0,017
[0.015] [0.025] [0.013] [0.022] [0.038] [0.021]
Poor neighborhood 0,003 0,014 0,003 0,005 0,002 0,002
[0.007] [0.013] [0.007] [0.014] [0.028] [0.011]
Year 1995 -0.039*** -0,032 -0.032*** -0.203*** -0.098* -0.179***
[0.009] [0.032] [0.009] [0.013] [0.054] [0.016]
HMO penetration -0,003 -0,106 -0,002 0,020 -0,031 0,027
[0.017] [0.078] [0.015] [0.031] [0.132] [0.024]
Charity Care Patient 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.009* 0.071*** 0.013**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007]
N 71080 71080 71080 34784 34784 34784
R2 0,331 0,324 0,175 0,353 0,365 0,185
Charity is a dummy equal to one if the patient receives charity care, poor is a dummy equal to 1 if the patient lives in a poor area. 
(1) OLS regression, (2) with IV instrumenting HMO penetration by firm size, (3) probit. (1)b, (2)b, (3)b are the same regressions but
including only these patients that stay in the hospital five days or less. 
1995 is a dummy equal to 1 if year==1995 and 0 if year==1985.
Robust standard errors appear in brackets.
* Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
* *Statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
*** statistically signifficant at 1% level.
All regressions include the following Demographic Variables: race/ethnicity dummies (African American, Asian, Hispanic, Native American),
male dummy, age (8 age groups starting at age 35), age and race interactions, age and sex interactions, race and sex interactions.
All regressions include the following Zip Variables: percentage in poverty, percentage unemployed, percentage with high school or more,
population. The following MSA variables are also included: HMO penetration, MCR penetration, MCD penetration and percentage of uninsured.
For the previous MSA variables I included both their level in 1985 and the change berween 1985 and 1995.
Length of stay<6 days
[1] [2] [3] [1b] [2b] [3b]
HMO*poor*1995 0.070* 0.159** 0.076** 0,030 0,105 0,057
[0.042] [0.063] [0.042] [0.068] [0.108] [0.065]
HMO*poor -0,041 -0,068 -0.004** -0,029 -0,006 -0,025
[0.027] [0.043] [0.002] [0.056] [0.093] [0.040]
HMO*1995 -0,029 -0.118** -0.043** -0,048 -0,131 -0.098**
[0.023] [0.050] [0.022] [0.035] [0.087] [0.033]
Poor*1995 -0,024 -0.068*** -0.024** -0,014 -0,057 -0,017
[0.015] [0.025] [0.013] [0.022] [0.038] [0.021]
Poor neighborhood 0,003 0,014 0,003 0,005 0,002 0,002
[0.007] [0.013] [0.007] [0.014] [0.028] [0.011]
Year 1995 -0.039*** -0,032 -0.032*** -0.203*** -0.098* -0.179***
[0.009] [0.032] [0.009] [0.013] [0.054] [0.016]
HMO penetration -0,003 -0,106 -0,002 0,020 -0,031 0,027
[0.017] [0.078] [0.015] [0.031] [0.132] [0.024]
Charity Care Patient 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.009* 0.071*** 0.013**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007]
N 71080 71080 71080 34784 34784 34784
R2 0,331 0,324 0,175 0,353 0,365 0,185
Charity is a dummy equal to one if the patient receives charity care, poor is a dummy equal to 1 if the patient lives in a poor area. 
(1) OLS regression, (2) with IV instrumenting HMO penetration by firm size, (3) probit. (1)b, (2)b, (3)b are the same regressions but
including only these patients that stay in the hospital five days or less. 
1995 is a dummy equal to 1 if year==1995 and 0 if year==1985.
Robust standard errors appear in brackets.
* Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
* *Statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
*** statistically signifficant at 1% level.
All regressions include the following Demographic Variables: race/ethnicity dummies (African American, Asian, Hispanic, Native American),
male dummy, age (8 age groups starting at age 35), age and race interactions, age and sex interactions, race and sex interactions.
All regressions include the following Zip Variables: percentage in poverty, percentage unemployed, percentage with high school or more,
population. The following MSA variables are also included: HMO penetration, MCR penetration, MCD penetration and percentage of uninsured.
For the previous MSA variables I included both their level in 1985 and the change berween 1985 and 1995. 
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Table A.4 
Impact of HMO Penetration on Probability of Dying from Heart 
Attack Patients Goint to Government Hospitals 
Dependent Variable: dummy equal to 1 if the patient died in the hospital and 0 otherwise 
Length of stay<6 days
[1] [2] [3] [1b] [2b] [3b]
HMO*Gov*1995 0.093* 0.224** 0.101* 0.131* 0,008 0.123*
[0.053] [0.077] [0.053] [0.080] [0.124] [0.070]
HMO*Gov hospital 0.061* 0,015 0.062** 0,019 0,123 0,044
[0.031] [0.050] [0.027] [0.062] [0.099] [0.044]
HMO*1995 -0,026 -0.131** -0.039* -0,056 -0,136 -0.096**
[0.023] [0.050] [0.022] [0.037] [0.088] [0.034]
Gov Hospital*1995 -0.055** -0.113*** -0.049*** -0.053* -0,009 -0.048*
[0.019] [0.030] [0.013] [0.027] [0.046] [0.022]
Gov hospital 0,007 0,021 0,005 0,009 -0,026 0,004
[0.009] [0.018] [0.007] [0.017] [0.033] [0.012]
Year 1995 -0.036*** -0,038 -0.030*** -0.203*** -0.095* -0.182***
[0.009] [0.033] [0.009] [0.013] [0.056] [0.016]
HMO penetration -0,018 -0,107 -0,017 0,016 -0,348 0,020
[0.017] [0.084] [0.016] [0.033] [0.244] [0.026]
Charity Care Patient 0.016*** 0.034*** 0.019*** 0,001 0.078*** 0,004
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008]
Poor  -0,005 -0,006 -0,004 -0,001 -0,0002 0,001
[0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.07] [0.010] [0.007]
N 61519 61519 61519 29991 29991 29991
R2 0,153 0,114 0,175 0,161 0,123 0,183
Gov is a dummy equal to one if the patient went to a government hospital. Charity is a dummy equal to one if the patient receives
charity care, poor is a dummy equal to 1 if the patient lives in a poor area.
(1) OLS regression, (2) with IV instrumenting HMO penetration by firm size, (3) probit. (1)b, (2)b, (3)b are the same regressions but
including only these patients that stay in the hospital five days or less. 
1995 is a dummy equal to 1 if year==1995 and 0 if year==1985.
Robust standard errors appear in brackets.
* Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
* *Statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
*** statistically signifficant at 1% level.
All regressions include the following Demographic Variables: race/ethnicity dummies (African American, Asian, Hispanic, Native American),
male dummy, age (8 age groups starting at age 35), age and race interactions, age and sex interactions, race and sex interactions.
All regressions include the following Zip Variables: percentage in poverty, percentage unemployed, percentage with high school or more,
population. The following MSA variables are also included: HMO penetration, MCR penetration, MCD penetration and percentage of uninsured.
For the previous MSA variables I included both their level in 1985 and the change berween 1985 and 1995.
Length of stay<6 days
[1] [2] [3] [1b] [2b] [3b]
HMO*Gov*1995 0.093* 0.224** 0.101* 0.131* 0,008 0.123*
[0.053] [0.077] [0.053] [0.080] [0.124] [0.070]
HMO*Gov hospital 0.061* 0,015 0.062** 0,019 0,123 0,044
[0.031] [0.050] [0.027] [0.062] [0.099] [0.044]
HMO*1995 -0,026 -0.131** -0.039* -0,056 -0,136 -0.096**
[0.023] [0.050] [0.022] [0.037] [0.088] [0.034]
Gov Hospital*1995 -0.055** -0.113*** -0.049*** -0.053* -0,009 -0.048*
[0.019] [0.030] [0.013] [0.027] [0.046] [0.022]
Gov hospital 0,007 0,021 0,005 0,009 -0,026 0,004
[0.009] [0.018] [0.007] [0.017] [0.033] [0.012]
Year 1995 -0.036*** -0,038 -0.030*** -0.203*** -0.095* -0.182***
[0.009] [0.033] [0.009] [0.013] [0.056] [0.016]
HMO penetration -0,018 -0,107 -0,017 0,016 -0,348 0,020
[0.017] [0.084] [0.016] [0.033] [0.244] [0.026]
Charity Care Patient 0.016*** 0.034*** 0.019*** 0,001 0.078*** 0,004
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008]
Poor  -0,005 -0,006 -0,004 -0,001 -0,0002 0,001
[0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.07] [0.010] [0.007]
N 61519 61519 61519 29991 29991 29991
R2 0,153 0,114 0,175 0,161 0,123 0,183
Gov is a dummy equal to one if the patient went to a government hospital. Charity is a dummy equal to one if the patient receives
charity care, poor is a dummy equal to 1 if the patient lives in a poor area.
(1) OLS regression, (2) with IV instrumenting HMO penetration by firm size, (3) probit. (1)b, (2)b, (3)b are the same regressions but
including only these patients that stay in the hospital five days or less. 
1995 is a dummy equal to 1 if year==1995 and 0 if year==1985.
Robust standard errors appear in brackets.
* Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
* *Statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
*** statistically signifficant at 1% level.
All regressions include the following Demographic Variables: race/ethnicity dummies (African American, Asian, Hispanic, Native American),
male dummy, age (8 age groups starting at age 35), age and race interactions, age and sex interactions, race and sex interactions.
All regressions include the following Zip Variables: percentage in poverty, percentage unemployed, percentage with high school or more,
population. The following MSA variables are also included: HMO penetration, MCR penetration, MCD penetration and percentage of uninsured.
For the previous MSA variables I included both their level in 1985 and the change berween 1985 and 1995.  
 